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Abstract: We consider a model of opinion formation based on aggregation functions. 
Each player modifies his opinion by arbitrarily aggregating the current opinion of all 
players. A player is influential on another player if the opinion of the first one matters to 
the latter. A generalization of an influential player to a coalition whose opinion matters 
to a player is called an influential coalition. Influential players (coalitions) can be 
graphically represented by the graph (hypergraph) of influence, and convergence 
analysis is based on properties of the hypergraphs of influence. In the paper, we focus on 
the practical issues of applicability of the model w.r.t. a standard framework for opinion 
formation driven by Markov chain theory. For a qualitative analysis of convergence, 
knowing the aggregation functions of the players is not required, one only needs to 
know the set of influential coalitions for each player. We propose simple algorithms that 
permit us to fully determine the influential coalitions. We distinguish three cases: the 
symmetric decomposable model, the anonymous model, and the general model. 
 
JEL Classification: C7, D7, D85 
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1  Introduction - dynamic models of opinion formation 
 
Models of opinion formation are widely studied in psychology, sociology, economics, 
mathematics, computer sciences, among others; for overviews, see, e.g., [32], [1]. A seminal 
model of opinion formation and imitation was introduced in [16]. In that model, individuals in a 
society start with initial opinions on a subject. The interaction patterns are described by a 
stochastic matrix, whose entry in row j  and column k  represents the weight “that player j  
places on the current belief of player k  in forming j 's belief for the next period”. These 
beliefs are updated over time. 
                                                     
1 The authors acknowledge the support by the National Agency for Research (Agence Nationale de la Recherche), Project ANR-14-CE24-0007-01 
``CoCoRICo-CoDec''. 
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While [16] assumes that players update their opinion by taking weighted averages of the 
opinions of all players, [27] investigate a model of opinion formation in which players update 
their beliefs according to arbitrary aggregation functions. [21] study a model of opinion 
formation in which ordered weighted averages are used in the process of updating information. 
In this paper, we consider the model of influence based on aggregation functions introduced in 
[27] and discuss practical issues of applying this model w.r.t. the “standard” framework for 
opinion formation driven by Markov chain theory. For a full qualitative analysis of the 
convergence of opinions, i.e., determining all the terminal classes (without their probabilities), it 
is sufficient to identify influential coalitions, which can be easily obtained by interviewing the 
agents. The aim of this paper is to show that a full qualitative analysis of convergence is feasible 
in practical situations. We introduce simple algorithms that permit us to fully determine the 
influential coalitions in three cases: the symmetric decomposable model (influential coalitions 
reduce to individuals), the anonymous model (only the number of agents matters, not their 
identity), and the general model. We show how clues on convergence can be obtained in a 
simple way, even without determining the reduced transition matrix. 
There exists a vast literature that presents other variations and extensions of the 
DeGroot model. We briefly recall some of them. In particular, [32] and [26] investigate a model, 
in which players update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors' 
opinions. According to these authors, one of the issues regarding the DeGroot framework 
concerns necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence of the social influence matrix and 
reaching a consensus; see additionally [9]. [32] also examines the speed of convergence of 
beliefs, and [26] analyze, in the context of the DeGroot model, whether consensus beliefs are 
“correct”, i.e., whether beliefs converge to the right probability, expectation, etc. The authors 
consider a sequence of societies, where each society is strongly connected and convergent in 
opinions, and described by its updating matrix. In each social network of the sequence, the 
belief of each player converges to the consensus limit belief. There is a true state of nature, and 
the sequence of networks is wise if the consensus limit belief converges in probability to the 
true state as the number of societies grows. 
Several other generalizations of the DeGroot model can be found in the literature, e.g., 
models in which the updating of beliefs can vary in time and circumstances; see e.g., [17], [35], 
[37], [23], [24]. In the model described by [17], players in a network try to estimate some 
unknown parameter. This model allows updating to vary over time, i.e., a player may place 
more or less weight on his own belief over time. The authors study the case of multidimensional 
opinions, in which each player has a vector of beliefs. They show that, in fact, individuals' 
opinions can often be well approximated by a one-dimensional line, where a player's position 
on the line determines his position on all issues. [23] and [24] study a similar framework, in 
which social attitudes depend on the attitudes of neighbors and evolve over time. In their 
model, players start with initial attitudes and then mix in some of their neighbors' recent 
attitudes with their starting attitudes. 
Also, other works in sociology related to influence are worth mentioning, e.g., the 
eigenvector-like notions of centrality and prestige ([33], [10], [11]), and models of social 
influence and persuasion by [22] and [29]; see also [39]. A sociological model of interactions on 
networks is also presented in [13]; see also [14], [15] and [36]. Conlisk introduces interactive 
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Markov chains, in which every entry in a state vector at each time represents the fraction of the 
population with some attribute. The matrix depends on the current state vector, i.e., the 
current social structure is taken into account to model how sociological dynamics evolve. In [28] 
threshold models of collective behavior are discussed. These are models in which agents have 
two alternatives and the costs and benefits of each depend on how many other agents choose 
which alternative. The author focuses on the effect of individual thresholds (i.e., the proportion 
or number of others that make their decision before a given agent) on collective behavior, 
discusses an equilibrium in a process occurring over time and the stability of equilibrium 
outcomes. Another model of influence is studied in [2] and [3]. This model consists of a network 
of nodes, each with a status evolving over time. The evolution of status acts according to an 
internal Markov chain, but the transition probabilities depend not only on the current status of 
the node, but also on the statuses of the neighboring nodes. 
More research on interaction is presented in [31] and [30], where the authors apply the 
command structure of [38] to model players' interactions using simple games. For each player, 
boss sets and approval sets are introduced, and based on these sets, a simple game called the 
command game for a player is built. In [30], the authors introduce an authority distribution over 
an organization and the (stochastic) power transition matrix, in which the entry in row j  and 
column k  is interpreted as agent j 's “power” transfered to k . The authority equilibrium 
equation is defined. In [30], multi-step commands are considered, where commands can be 
implemented through command channels. 
There is also a vast literature on learning in the context of social networks; see e.g. [6], 
[18], [19], [20], [4], [5], [25], [12], [7]. In general, in models of social learning agents observe 
choices over time and update their beliefs accordingly, which is different from models where 
choices depend on the influence of others. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents fundamental material on models of 
influence based on aggregation functions, as well as establishing notation and terminology, and 
recalls an essential result, which is the basis for determining the qualitative part of the model of 
influence. Section 3 addresses the problem of determining a model of influence in practice and 
focuses on determining its qualitative part, which is sufficient for a qualitative analysis of 
convergence. Section 4 gives some concluding remarks. 
 
2  A model of influence based on aggregation functions 
 
In this section, we recapitulate a model of influence based on aggregation functions 
([27]). Consider a set },{1,:= nN   of players that have to make a yes-no decision on a certain 
issue. Each player has an initial opinion, which may change due to mutual interaction (influence) 
between players. By TSb ,  we denote the probability that the set S  of ‘yes’-voters becomes 
T  after one step of influence. We assume that the process of influence may iterate, and 
therefore obtain a stochastic process of influence, depicting the evolution of the coalition of 
`yes'-players in time. We assume that the process is Markovian ( TSb ,  depends on S  and T , 
but not on the whole history) and stationary ( TSb ,  is constant over time). The states of this 
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finite Markovian process are all subsets NS   representing the set of ‘yes’-players, and we 
also have the transition matrix NTSTSb ,, ][:=B , which is a 
nn 22   row-stochastic matrix. 
For a qualitative description of the convergence of the process, it is sufficient to know 
the reduced matrix B
~
 given by  
 



.otherwise0,
0> if1,
=
~ ,
,
TS
TS
b
b  
and equivalently represented by the transition graph ),(2= EN , where E  is the set of arcs, 
its vertices are all possible coalitions, and the arc ),( TS  from state S  to state T  exists if 
and only if 1=
~
,TSb . 
Definition 1. An n -place aggregation function is a mapping [0,1][0,1]: nA  satisfying   
    (i)  0=, 0 )( 0 ,A , 1=,1)(1,A  (boundary conditions)  
    (ii)  If 'xx   then )'()( xx AA   (nondecreasingness).  
  
To each player Ni  we associate an aggregation function iA , which specifies the way 
player i  modifies his opinion based on the opinions of the other players. Let ),,(:= 1 nAA A  
denote the vector of aggregation functions. We compute ))(1,),(1(=)(1 1 SnSS AA A , where 
S1  is the characteristic vector of S , and )(1SiA  indicates the probability of player i  saying 
‘yes’ at the next step when the set of agents presently saying ‘yes’ is S . We assume that these 
probabilities are independent over the set of agents. Hence the probability of transition from 
the yes-coalition S  to the yes-coalition T  is given by  
 )).(1(1)(1=, Si
Ti
Si
Ti
TS AAb 

 (1) 
 
A detailed study of convergence under this model is provided in [27]. It is shown, in 
particular, that three types of terminal class2 can exist: singletons, cycles, and regular terminal 
classes. The first case occurs when a class is reduced to a single coalition (called the terminal 
state). The second one is the case where no convergence occurs because the process endlessly 
cycles over a sequence of coalitions, and the last case occurs when the class is a Boolean lattice 
of the form }|2{ LSKS N   for some sets LK , . In any case, N  and   are terminal 
states (called trivial terminal states). 
We emphasize two particular aggregation functions. The first one is the well-known 
weighted arithmetic mean (WAM), defined by  
 ii
n
i
nw xwxx 
1=
1 =),,(WAM  , 
where ),,(= 1 nwww   is a weight vector, i.e., 
nw [0,1]  with the property 1=
1= i
n
i
w . 
Weighted arithmetic means are used in most models of opinion formation, e.g., the DeGroot 
model. Another noteable aggregation function is the ordered weighted arithmetic mean (OWA) 
                                                     
2 A class is a maximal collection of coalitions such that for any two distinct coalitions TS,  in the class, there exists a sequence of transitions 
inside the class leading from S  to T . A class is terminal if no transition to a coalition outside that class is possible. 
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([40]), defined by  
 )(
1=
1 =),,(OWA ii
n
i
nw xwxx  , 
where w  is a weight vector, and the inputs have been arranged in decreasing order: 
)((1) nxx  . Note that, unlike in the case of WAM, these weights do not act on inputs, but on 
the rank of the inputs, so that the minimum and the maximum are particular cases, by taking 
,0,1)(0,= w  and ,0)(1,0,= w , respectively. Applied to our context of influence where the 
input vectors are binary, if each agent aggregates his opinions according to an OWA, we obtain 
a model of anonymous influence, because each agent updates his opinion according to the 
number of agents saying ‘yes’, not to which agents say ‘yes’. Models of anonymous influence 
have been studied in detail in [21]. 
 
Definition 2. Let iA  be the aggregation function of agent i . A nonempty coalition NS   is 
yes-influential for i  if   
    (i)  0>)(1SiA   
    (ii)  For all SS  , 0=)(1SiA  .  
 Similarly, a coalition S  is no-influential for i  if   
    (i)  1<)(1 \SNiA   
    (ii)  For all SS  , 1=)(1 \SNiA  .  
  We denote by yesiC  and 
no
iC  the collections of yes- and no-influential coalitions for i . 
Coalition S  is yes-influential for player i  if, when the players in S  say ‘yes’ and every other 
player says ‘no’, i  has a positive probability of saying `yes' (and similarly for no-influential 
coalitions). Moreover, S  has no superfluous player. If an influential coalition is formed by only 
one player, then we call it an influential player. Note that these collections are never empty, 
since if no proper subcoalition of N  were yes- or no-influential, then N  would be both yes- 
and no-influential by Definition 2. More importantly, each such collection is an antichain in N2 , 
that is, for any two distinct members of the collection SS , , SS   and SS  . 
Influential players can easily be represented in a directed graph. Define yesAG , the graph 
of yes-influence, as follows: the set of nodes is the set of agents N , and there is an arc ),( ij  
from j  to i  if j  is yes-influential on i . The graph of no-influence noAG  is defined similarly. 
The representation of influential coalitions requires the more complex notion of a hypergraph. 
 
Definition 3.  We define the following concepts:  
 
(i)  A hypergraph [8] H  is a pair ),( EN  with N  being the set of nodes and E  the set of  
hyperedges, where a hyperedge ES  is a nonempty subset of N . If 2|=| S  for all 
ES , then we have a classical graph.  
(ii)  A directed hypergraph on N  is a pair ),( DN  with D  being the set of directed 
hyperedges, where a directed hyperedge is an ordered pair ),( SS   (called an hyperarc 
from S   to S  ), with SS ,  both being nonempty.  
6 
 
(iii)  A directed hyperpath from i  to j  is a sequence qqqq iSSiiSSiSSi ),(),(),( 12221110   , 
where qq ijiiii =:,,,,:= 110   are nodes, ),(,),,( 11 qq SSSS    are hyperarcs such that 
1 kk iS  and kk iS   for all qk ,1,=  .  
  We define the hypergraphs noyes, AA HH  of yes-influence and no-influence as follows: 
for yesAH , the set of nodes is N , and there is a hyperarc }){,( iC  for each 
yes
iC C  (similarly 
for noAH ). 
Grabisch and Rusinowska [27] prove that the hypergraphs noyes, AA HH  (equivalently, the 
collections yesiC  and 
no
iC  for all Ni ) are equivalent to the reduced matrix B
~
, and 
therefore contain the entire qualitative description of convergence.   
Theorem 1. Consider an influence process B  based on the aggregation functions A . Then B
~
 
can be reconstructed from the hypergraphs yesAH  and 
no
AH  as follows: for any 
NTS 2,  , 
1=
~
,TSb  if and only if  
 
(i)  For each Ti , there exists a nonempty SSi   such that iS   is yes-influential on i , 
i.e., yesiiS C ; and  
(ii)  For each Ti , there exists a nonempty iS   such that  =SSi  and iS   is 
no-influential on i , i.e., noiiS C .  
In particular, 0=
~
,Tb  for all T , 1=,b , and 0=
~
,TNb  for all NT  , 1=,NNb .  
Recall that (1) is valid only if the probabilities of saying ‘yes’ are independent over the set of 
agents. Therefore, non-independence in this sense makes the determination of the transition 
matrix difficult. However, B
~
 is insensitive to possible correlation between agents, because 
1=
~
,TSb  if and only if 0>)(1SiA  for every Ti  and 1<)(1SiA  for every Ti , regardless 
of the correlation between agents. 
 
3  Determination of the model 
 An important issue concerns the determination of a model of influence of the above 
type in a practical situation. This implies that we are making essentially two assumptions:   
1.  Each agent aggregates the opinion of all the other agents to form his opinion in the 
next step.  
2.  The aggregation function is monotonically increasing.  
 The latter assumption implies that anti-conformist behaviors (i.e., the more individuals 
say ‘yes’, the more I am inclined to say ‘no’) cannot be modeled in this framework. 
 
3.1  General considerations 
 Complete determination of the model amounts to identifying either the transition 
matrix B  or all the aggregation functions nAA ,,1   (assuming the absence of correlation). 
Considering the size of the matrix B  ( nn 22  ), statistical determination of B  seems to be 
nearly impossible, unless a huge number of observations are made. As for the determination of 
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the aggregation functions, the situation is even worse, since questioning agents about their 
aggregation functions (type, parameters) appears to be quite unrealistic. We know from Section 
2 that knowledge of the reduced matrix B
~
 is enough to obtain a qualitative description of the 
convergence of the model, which is insensitive to possible correlations between agents. 
Moreover, knowledge of B
~
 (size n22 ) is equivalent by Theorem 1 to knowledge of the 
collections of all yes- and no-influential coalitions (size at most 









2
2 n
n
n ), which is, in turn, 
equivalent to knowledge of the hypergraphs of yes- and no-influence. In some favorable cases 
(e.g., the WAM model), the hypergraphs reduce to ordinary graphs. This immediately indicates 
two ways of identifying the (qualitative part of the) model: either by observation of the 
transitions, i.e., the evolution of the coalition of the ‘yes’ agents, or by interviewing the agents. 
In the first case, observing a transition from S  to T  yields 1=
~
,TSb . In the second case, 
interviews permit us to determine influential coalitions or graphs of influence. 
In the rest of this section, we mainly focus on the second approach. Concerning the first 
one, we only mention an important fact. The underlying assumptions of the model mean that 
the reduced matrix B
~
 is not arbitrary and has specific properties. Recall that 1=
~
,TSb  if and 
only if for all Ti , 0>)(1SiA  and for all Ti , 1<)(1SiA . This implies the following fact:  
Fact 1  For a given NS  , NS , , the candidates’ transitions are all sets of the 
form LKT = , where  
 1}=)(1|{= SiANiK   
 1}.<)(1<0|{ SiANiL   
  
In other words, T , the intersection of all possible transitions from S  yields the set 
1}=)(1|{= SiANiK  , while TN \  yields 0}=)(1|{= SiANiK  . When S  increases, 
K  increases, while K   decreases. This fact permits us to detect, when B
~
 is constructed 
from observations, possible deviations from the model (e.g., presence of anti-conformists). 
 
3.2  Determination of influential coalitions 
 We may distinguish three cases, according to the type of underlying model:   
(i)  WAM model (symmetric decomposable model): all aggregation functions are 
weighted arithmetic means;  
(ii)  OWA model (anonymous model): all aggregation functions are ordered weighted 
averages;  
(iii)  general model (no special assumptions).  
 
 
The symmetric decomposable model. 
 The case of the WAM model is particularly simple and has been studied in depth in 
[27]. It has been proved to be equivalent to a symmetric decomposable model. An aggregation 
model is decomposable if for every agent Ni , every yes- and no-influential coalition for 
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agent i  is a singleton. Now, an aggregation model is symmetric if a yes-influential coalition for 
i  is also no-influential for i  and vice versa, for every Ni . Note that the first property 
implies that the hypergraphs of yes- and no-influence reduce to ordinary graphs, while the 
second property implies that the two graphs are identical, and therefore the whole (qualitative) 
model is represented by a single graph representing influence. This makes interviewing agents 
particularly simple: it suffices to ask to every agent whom he asks for advice. Then, i  asks j  
for advice is translated into the graph representing influence by an arc from j  to i . 
In [27], we applied this technique to a real case, namely the manager network of 
Krackhardt ([34]). The agents are the 21 managers of a small manufacturing firm in the USA, and 
the network is obtained as follows: each agent k  is asked if he/she thinks that agent i  asks 
agent j  for advice. An arc from j  to i  is placed in the graph representing influence if a 
majority of agents think that i  asks j  for advice. From the graph, and due to the properties 
of symmetric decomposable models, many conclusions can be easily drawn on the convergence 
of the model. In particular, it is possible to detect the presence of regular terminal classes 
(Theorem 8 in [27]). There is also a simple criterion to determine if there is no regular terminal 
class: it suffices that for each agent i , there is an arc in the influence graph from )(cl i  to 
every agent outside )(cl i , where )(cl i , the closure of i , is the set of agents who can reach i  
by a path in the influence graph. 
 
The anonymous model. 
 According to the OWA model, agents do not change their opinion due to particular 
individuals, but due to the number of individuals saying ‘yes’. Therefore, in general these are 
not decomposable models, and one needs to determine influential coalitions as in the general 
case. However, because according to these models the players are anonymous, a collection 
yes
iC  or 
no
iC  is composed of all sets of a given size s , ns 1 , and this is characteristic of an 
anonymous model. Therefore, under the assumption of anonymity, it suffices to ask to every 
agent i  the following questions:  
 Q1:  Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘yes’. What is the minimal number 
of agents saying ‘no’ that may make you change your opinion? 
Q2:  Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘no’. What is the minimal number of 
agents saying ‘yes’ that may make you change your opinion?  
 Assuming that the answers are respectively s  and s , it follows that  
 }.|=||2{=},|=||2{= yesno sSSsSS Ni
N
i
 CC  
Now, it is easy to see that given ss ,  for agent i , one can get the form of the weight vector 
w  in the aggregation function wOWA  of agent i  (Proposition 2 in [21]):  
 ),000,,000(=
zeros1zeros1




ss
w  
where ``  '' indicates any nonzero weight. In particular, all agents are yes-influential 
(respectively, no-influential) on i  if and only if 0>1w  (respectively, 0>nw ). 
As for convergence under this model, it is shown in [21] (Proposition 3) that no cycle can 
occur, but the two other types of terminal classes may occur. Terminal states are easily 
detected as follows: S  of size s  is a terminal state if and only if for every Si , the size of a 
9 
 
no-influential coalition is at least 1 sn , and for every Si , the size of a yes-influential 
coalition is at least 1s . The absence of regular terminal classes can also be characterized only 
through influential coalitions, but this condition is more complex (see Corollary 3 in the 
aforementioned paper).  
 
The general model. 
 We now address the general case, where no special assumption is made on the model, 
except the following: we assume that each agent is yes- and no-influential on himself, which 
means that 0>)(1iiA , 1<)(1 \iNiA  (in other words, the agent trusts his opinion to a nonnull 
extent). This induces some simplification in the algorithm, but it would not be difficult to 
generalize it, in order to overcome this limitation. 
 
  Interview for Agent i  
0. Set }}{{=yes iiC , }}{{=
no iiC , 
iN
ii
\noyes 2==NN . 
% noyes, ii NN  are the sets of candidate coalitions. 
1. For each agent Nj , ij  , ask3: 
Q: Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘yes’. Would you be inclined to change 
your opinion if Agent j  says ‘no’ ? 
If the answer is positive:   
    • add }{ j  to noiC , and discard }{ j  and all sets containing j  from 
no
iN .  
    • If =noiN , STOP (GO TO STEP 3).  
 Otherwise, discard }{ j  from noiN . 
2. For 2=  to 1n , do: 
2.1. Define }|=|:{= no SS iNS  . 
2.2 Ask: Q: Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘yes’. Would you be inclined to 
change your opinion if one of the coalitions in S  says ‘no’? In the case of affirmative answer, 
for which ones? 
For every set S  answered, do:   
    • add S  to noiC  and discard all supersets of S  from 
no
iN  
    • If =noiN  or if 








2
|=| no n
n
iC , STOP (GO TO STEP 3).  
 
2.3 Set SNN \nono ii  . 
 
3. Exactly as in Steps 1 and 2 for yesiC , Question 1 becomes: Suppose that your opinion 
on some question is ‘no’. Would you be inclined to change your opinion if Agent j  says ‘yes’?, 
etc. 
                                                     
3 As in Step 2, it is possible to gather all these questions into a single one: Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘yes’. Would you be 
inclined to change your opinion if one of the agents in iN \  says ‘no’? In the case of an affirmative answer, for which ones? 
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We give some examples.  
Example 1. (braces are omitted when denoting coalitions) Consider }{1,2,3,4,5=N . We detail 
the process of interviewing Agent 1.   
(i)  We have {1}=no1C . We take agent 2.  
 Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘yes’. Would you be inclined to change 
your opinion if Agent 2  says ‘no’ ?  
 Answer: Yes. Hence, {1,2}=no1C , and 35,45,345}{3,4,5,34,=
no
1N .  
(ii)  Agent 3.  
 Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘yes’. Would you be inclined to change 
your opinion if Agent 3  says ‘no’ ?  
 Answer: No. Thus ,45,345}{4,5,34,35=no1N .  
(iii)  Agent 4.  
 Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘yes’. Would you be inclined to change 
your opinion if Agent 4  says ‘no’ ?  
 Answer: No. Thus 5,345}{5,34,35,4=no1N .  
(iv)  Agent 5.  
 Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘yes’. Would you be inclined to change 
your opinion if Agent 5  says ‘no’ ?  
 Answer: No. Thus 345}{34,35,45,=no1N .  
(v)  Coalitions of size 2.  
 Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘yes’. Would you be inclined to change 
your opinion if one of the coalitions in {34,35,45} says ‘no’? In the case of an affirmative 
answer, for which ones?  
 Answer: Yes, 34. Thus {1,2,34}=noiC , and {35,45}=
no
1N . It follows that =
no
1N , 
since all coalitions of size 2 are discarded. STOP.  
Finally, {1,2,34}=no1C . We do the same for 
yes
1C .   
 
(i)  For all individual agents:  
Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘no’. Would you be inclined to change 
your opinion if one of the agents 2, 3, 4, 5 says ‘yes’? In the case of an affirmative answer, for 
which ones?  
Answer: No. Thus ,345,2345}34,235,24534,35,45,2{23,24,25,=yes1N .  
(ii)  Coalitions of size 2:  
 Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘no’. Would you be inclined to change 
your opinion if one of the coalitions in 34,35,45}{23,24,25,  says ‘yes’? In the case of an 
affirmative answer, for which ones?  
 Answer: No. Thus 5}45,345,234{234,235,2=yes1N .  
(iii)  Coalitions of size 3:  
 Suppose that your opinion on some question is ‘no’. Would you be inclined to change 
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your opinion if one of the coalitions in 45,345}{234,235,2  says ‘yes’? In the case of an 
affirmative answer, for which ones?  
 Answer: Yes: 234, 235, 245. Thus =yes1N , STOP.  
 Finally, ,245,345}{1,234,235=yes1C   
We now give another example to illustrate how the reduced transition matrix B
~
 can be 
obtained from the influential coalitions using Theorem 1. To this end, we suppose that the 
above algorithm has been applied to each agent, in order to obtain all influential coalitions. The 
condition that every agent is self-influential permits us to simplify the application of the 
theorem to determine each term TSb ,
~
. Indeed, the following facts are easy to show.  
Fact 2  Suppose that yes}{ ii C  and 
no}{ ii C  for every Ni . It follows that:   
(i)  1=
~
,SSb  for every 
NS 2 ;  
(ii)  If ST  , condition (i) in Theorem 1 is always sufficient to check that 1=
~
,TSb ; 
moreover, if 0=
~
,TSb , then 0=
~
',TSb  for every TT  ; similarly, if 1=
~
,TSb , then 1=
~
',TSb  
for every STT  ;  
(iii)  If ST  , condition (ii) in Theorem 1 is always sufficient to check that 1=
~
,TSb ; 
moreover, if 0=
~
,TSb , then 0=
~
',TSb  for every TT  ; similarly, if 1=
~
,TSb , then 1=
~
',TSb  
for every TTS  .  
  
Example 2. Consider a society {1,2,3,4}=N  of 4 agents. Suppose that the following 
collections have been obtained (braces are omitted when denoting coalitions):  
 {1,234}={1,2,34},= yes1
no
1 CC  
 {2,134}={2,34},= yes2
no
2 CC  
 {3,12}={2,3},= yes3
no
3 CC  
 {4}={12,4},= yes4
no
4 CC  
 Observe that agent 4 is stubborn when he supports ‘yes’ (no influence is possible when agent 4 
thinks ‘yes’). 
Let us apply Theorem 1. Using Fact 2, one easily finds that 1=
~
,TSb  only for the 
following TS,  (braces omitted):  
 ,1=:1= TS  
 ,2=:2= TS  
 ,3=:3= TS  
 ,4=:4= TS  
 13,23,123,1,2,3,12,=:12= TS  
 ,1,3,13=:13= TS  
 4,14=:14= TS  
 23=:23= TS  
 24=:24= TS  
 ,3,4,34=:34= TS  
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 123=:123= TS  
 124,1234=:124= TS  
 34,1234,124,134,24,14,24,34=:134= TS  
 234,1234.=:234= TS  
 
 We detail the case 12=S  for illustrative purposes. We can see from condition (ii) of 
Theorem 1 that =T  is possible (i.e., 1=
~
,TSb ). Indeed, for 1,2,3,4=i , there exists a set in 
no
iC  which is disjoint from 12 . Thus, by Fact 2 (ii), it follows that 1,2,12=T  are also possible. 
Now, for 13,23=T  both conditions of Theorem 1 must be checked, while for 123=T , only 
condition (i) has to be checked. Lastly, observe that all the remaining sets contain 4. Thus 
condition (i) of Theorem 1 is never satisfied, since there is no yes4CS  which is included in 12. 
One can check that Fact 1 is satisfied. Observe that this approach is very useful to 
identify quickly all the possible T 's: it suffices to find the minimal one ( K ) and the maximal 
one ( LK ). 
The corresponding transition graph   is given in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
  
Figure  1: Transition graph (loops are omitted). The terminal states are denoted in red and 
larger font 
    
It is seen that, apart from the trivial terminal classes, 23, 24 and 123 are terminal states. 
There is no regular nor cyclic class.  
We now show that it is possible to get conclusions on convergence without computing 
B
~
, by solely examining the hypergraphs, thanks to results presented in [27]. To this end, we 
need the notion of an ingoing hyperarc. We say that a coalition S  has an ingoing hyperarc 
),( TT   in hypergraph H  if SNT \  and ST   (and vice versa for an outgoing 
hyperarc). 
Now, Theorem 3 in the aforementioned paper establishes that a nonempty NS   is a 
terminal state if and only if S  has no ingoing arc in the hypergraph no*yes ˆ)ˆ( AA HH  , where 
*()  
indicates that the hyperarcs have been inverted, and Hˆ  indicates that only normal hyperarcs 
13 
 
are considered4. 
This result can be translated in terms of influential collections as follows:  
Fact 3  A nonempty NS   is a terminal state if and only if   
(i)  For every Si , there is no 
yes
iT C  such that ST  ;  
(ii)  For every Si , there is no noiT C  such that  =ST .  
  
 Applying this fact to Example 1, we indeed find that the only terminal states are 23, 24 
and 123. For example, 23 is a terminal state, because none of 1, 234 are subsets of 23 (condition 
(i) for 1=i ), 4 is not a subset of 12 (condition (i) for 4=i ), none of 2, 34 are disjoint from 23 
(condition (ii) for 2=i ), and none of 2, 3 are disjoint from 23 (condition (ii) for 3=i ). 
The advantage of Fact 3 is that it is not necessary to find all TS,  such that 1=
~
,TSb  
(i.e., it is not necessary to know the transition graph) to check whether a given coalition is a 
terminal state (or to find all of them). 
 
4  Concluding remarks 
 We have shown how, in a practical situation, one can determine a model of influence 
based on aggregation functions. Exact determination of such a model, yielding the type and 
parameters of the aggregation function of each agent, appears to be out of reach without using 
complex procedures. What we show is that, on the contrary, it is easy to obtain the “qualitative 
part” of the model, which permits a full qualitative analysis of the convergence of opinions, that 
is, to determine all terminal classes. This is sufficient to predict whether a consensus will occur 
or, on the contrary, society will become polarized, or a cycle will appear, etc. Simple criteria are 
available to detect terminal states or the presence of regular terminal classes, without even 
determining the reduced transition matrix. We believe that this study will make the use of 
models of influence based on aggregation functions more familiar and easier to use. 
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